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Abstract 
This article explores conceptions of moral status in the work of American thriller author Dean 
Koontz, beginning with general theories used by philosophers to determine whether particular 
entities have moral status. This includes both uni-criterial theories and multi-criterial theories 
of moral status. After this examination, the article argues for exploring bioethics conceptions 
in popular fiction, a rich source for analysis because it provides not only a good 
approximation of the beliefs of ordinary members of the moral community but also explores 
important issues in a context where ordinary individuals are likely to encounter them. 
Following from this, the article explores theories of moral status in the context of Koontz’s 
novels, in particular, Watchers and Koontz’s Frankenstein series. Through these works, 
Koontz indicates that entities have moral status for a variety of reasons and thus presumably, 
he is a proponent of multi-criterial theories of moral status. The article concludes with an 
examination of what this might mean for our understanding of moral status claims generally. 
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Introduction 
Theories of moral status 
One of the first tasks for making moral decisions is to determine not only what moral rights 
others are entitled to but what ‘others’ are entitled to those rights. In other words, we need to 
determine who matters morally in addition to determining what acting morally means. The 
mechanism used to determine who matters morally is a theory of moral status. Theories of 
moral status take a variety of forms. Some theories argue that only human beings have moral 
status. These theories suggest that we only need concern ourselves with the results of our 
actions if those affected are also human. If they are not, then any action we do cannot be 
considered immoral. Other theories do not depend upon species classifications but are instead 
dependent upon characteristics of the entity in question.
1
 If the entity has particular, usually 
cognitive, characteristics, then it is entitled to a particular moral status
 
 (Warren 1997).  If it is 
not, then it is not entitled to any moral status at all. The most common characteristics used in 
moral status claims are life (those entities which are alive are entitled to moral status) 
(Warren 1997), sentience (those entities which can feel pain are entitled to moral status) 
(Singer 1993) and personhood (those entities with the capacity for rational thought [and 
related mental characteristics] are entitled to moral status) (Glover 1977; Harris 1985; Kuhse 
and Singer 1985; Tooley 1983).
2
 Other theories might rely on social connections in order to 
create moral status (Gilligan 1982; Noddings 1978). In these theories, those with moral status 
are those entities which have particular social connections to us such as family or society or 
create particular feelings of empathy in us.  
 
All of these theories, however, have problems. Those based upon species membership need to 
account for arguments against speciesism - the concern that species membership is not a 
morally relevant category and thus cannot ground a morally relevant distinction like moral 
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status (Harris and Holm 2003; Singer 1993). Since, the argument posits, species membership 
is based upon biological factors over which the entity has no control, it does not provide a 
sufficient basis to determine the limits to our moral actions (Harris and Holm 2003). Instead, 
only morally relevant criteria should provide a basis for moral status claims. Those based 
upon characteristics of the entity in question, however, also have significant problems. First, 
these characteristic-based methods tend to be considered either over or under-inclusive. They 
either include entities we think should not be included (microbes, insects, rats, etc.), or they 
do not include entities (usually human newborns or humans with severe mental disabilities) 
who we think ought to be included. Second, it is important to determine what is meant by 
‘having’ a particular characteristic in these types of theories. Does it mean the actual exercise 
of these capabilities (must individuals actually act rationally?), or the capacity to exercise 
these capabilities or something different? Even if we successfully overcome this hurdle, we 
have additional evidentiary problems which might exist such as the sufficiency of evidence to 
determine rationality (Smith 2012). Does the use of tools suffice (in which case any number 
of non-human animals count)? Is it the use of language? Is it evidence of self-awareness? 
What if any relevant tests conflict? What if, for example, a particular entity appears to be able 
to use language but is not self-aware? Moreover, on whom does the burden of proof lie and 
what is the applicable standard of proof? Characteristic-based theories, then, have at least as 
many problems as those based upon species membership. Ones based upon social 
connections, though, appear to be no different as one may wonder to what extent these 
theories trade on the ‘yuk’ or ‘cute’ factors of entities which have little to no moral 
importance (Warren 1997). 
 
This has led some to posit that no single theory of moral status adequately presents our views 
on the subject (Warren 1997; Beauchamp and Childress 2009; Smith 2012), nor could one 
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single theory of moral status ever accurately reflect what are a series of complex views about 
how and why entities matter in our moral decision making. Instead of proposing different 
uni-criterial theories of moral status then, some have argued that the way forward is through 
multi-criterial theories which allow a myriad of ways that entities could claim moral status 
subject (Warren 1997; Beauchamp and Childress 2009; Smith 2012). It is claimed that these 
provide a more solid basis for our moral actions as well as more closely aligning with general 
intuitions about moral status. Even these, however, may not be completely free from doubt. 
Multi-criterial theories of moral status, by their very nature, are more complex than their uni-
criterial counterparts. They may involve different levels of moral status further complicating 
our decision making process.
3
 Furthermore, multi-criterial theories of moral status have the 
likely impact of increasing the number of entities with moral status, meaning we need to 
consider more of them in our decision-making process.  
 
Consequently, it is worth exploring theories of moral status in considerable detail, including 
the benefits of multi-criterial theories. In particular, we ought to be able to test the extent to 
which multi-criterial theories correspond to our general intuitions about moral status. One 
method for doing so would be the use of detailed surveys which explored the ways in which 
members of our moral community engaged in moral reasoning and assigned moral status to 
various entities. Such information, while useful, will not satisfy all of the potential questions 
we might have about moral status. Surveys may be badly designed, those participating might 
not be representative, participants might answer in different ways, intentionally or otherwise, 
from how they act in real world situations. Survey data, even if it existed, then, would only be 
one possible method to explore the benefits of these theories.  
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Popular literature and Dean Koontz 
It is also worthwhile to explore how individuals act in situations in the real world. One 
method for which we might do this is through the use of literature. While not an exact 
parallel, what we choose to read provides evidence about our views and what we consider 
important. This is true not only of the literature we read for specific knowledge-based reasons 
(for example, academic journal articles) but also for what we read for entertainment. What we 
find entertaining tells us at least something about ourselves – about how we think, about our 
likes and dislikes, and about what we think important. This article, then, will explore 
concepts of moral status through the use of characters in popular fiction, particularly that of 
Dean Koontz.
4
 Two questions which might arise at the start are (1) why use characters in 
popular fiction at all (as opposed to other types of fiction), and (2) why use Dean Koontz? As 
a preliminary matter, these two questions are worthy of response. We can begin with the first 
question. 
 
Philosophers often use hypothetical examples to explain complex ideas and to help clarify 
matters in the mind of the reader. Due to normal space requirements, these hypothetical 
examples are usually short and, consequently, not very detailed. They usually consist of 
simplified versions of humans (or others) to emphasize a particular distinction between them. 
While these hypothetical examples have their place, there is also scope to consider broader 
and more complex examples when we explore ethical decision-making. Simple examples can 
often hide nuances and intricacies which are revealed when we examine more detailed cases. 
Of course, one way we explore these difficulties is through the use of cases studies, which are 
often more complex. However, even these do not always provide a sufficient basis for all of 
our ethical discussions. Case studies may add factors which detract from the central issues 
being explored. There may also be important information which is not disclosed because of a 
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lack of information (we may, for example, know little of a patient’s wishes or mental state.) 
Moreover, case studies might not be appropriate – either because of concerns over the 
disclosure of information or because we are examining possible future cases as opposed to 
current real ones. It is particularly in these sorts of cases where fiction might be especially 
useful. Fictional characters can inhabit worlds or scenarios which do not currently exist (and 
even may be unlikely to exist in the near future). They can thus provide us with possible 
worlds to ground our philosophical discussions and provide a rich, complex storyline which 
can better allow us to explore complex issues than that available through the use of 
hypothetical examples.  
 
That, of course, only provides something of a justification for the use of fiction. Popular 
fiction, though, might seem less useful although there are certain benefits to the use of 
popular fiction to explore these sorts of questions. First, unlike (perhaps) most philosophical 
literature, the primary purpose of popular fiction is to engage with the public. If the author of 
popular fiction has done his job, readers are expected to relate to characters and to do so in 
particular ways. Popular fiction is supposed to encourage readers to empathize with specific 
characters and not to empathize with others. We are supposed to understand their motivations 
(whether or not we are expected to agree with them) and to have specific reactions to their 
thoughts, words and actions. Secondly, popular fiction might also provide a reasonable 
analogue for the thoughts of ordinary members of the moral community (those without 
specific training in ethics, philosophy, theology or law).  Best-selling authors presumably sell 
the number of books that they do because their words resonate with the community. They 
attempt to cause particular reactions and feelings in their readers which are replicated across a 
community in meaningful ways. They create a connection in ways that other literature or 
other writing (academic writing, for instance) do not. Third, popular fiction not only provides 
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an analogue for what people might think but we can also reasonably assume that what we 
read often has an important normative role in our thinking. What we read often provides 
influences which cause us to think in particular ways. It convinces us what to think in 
addition to providing a mirror which reflects our own views. Finally, popular fiction is useful 
for no other reason than that people do actually read it. If we wish to explain the reasoning of 
ordinary people, then it is crucial to consider the sorts of literature with which they will come 
into contact. Analysis should therefore include the literature ordinary people often read and 
the ways in which even popular literature can explore important moral and philosophical 
questions.  
 
Even if those arguments are persuasive as to why there might be reasons to examine popular 
literature for use in bioethics, they probably do not necessarily provide reasons to examine 
the works of Dean Koontz in particular. There are reasons, however, as to why he might be a 
particularly useful author to examine, especially in relation to moral status claims and 
bioethics generally. First, he clearly fits within the category of popular fiction authors. His 
books have sold over 450 million copies worldwide and have been published in over thirty-
eight languages.
5
 Fourteen of his books have reached number one on the New York Times 
bestseller list (hardback), and sixteen have reached number one on the paperback list.
6
 Under 
whatever definition of ‘popular’ fiction we wish to construct, Koontz qualifies. There are, 
however, two additional elements which make him especially useful for the purposes of 
exploring conceptions of moral status. First, many of the characters which populate Koontz’s 
fiction are borderline. They often straddle boundaries between human and not-human, are 
altered versions of existing creatures (for example, he favors intelligent animal characters, 
especially dogs), and monstrous entities created out of whole cloth. This, then, makes him 
different from other best-selling authors such as James Patterson and John Grisham, who tend 
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to focus only on human beings. However, unlike some of his contemporaries in horror fiction 
such as Stephen King,
7
 Koontz focuses primarily on scientifically-based monstrous 
characters instead of supernatural ones. His ‘monsters’, then, are more likely to be genetically 
engineered, cloned or otherwise created by humans as opposed to arising from supernatural 
origins (such as demons, ghosts, vampires or other staple ‘monsters’ within the horror genre). 
This, of course, also separates him from those working within the fantasy field such as 
George RR Martin or JK Rowling. We thus have a rich range of characters to examine, and it 
is even possible to explore characters across books as the method of ‘creation’ is often 
similar. We, consequently, not only have a number of characters from which to choose but 
also a range within character types which will aid analysis. Additionally, Koontz has himself 
entered the debate on moral status with his novel, One Door Away from Heaven (2001, 
hereafter One Door). We therefore have a relatively clear statement of his position. 
Obviously, the fact that he has outlined a position in a novel does not necessarily mean that 
he actually abides by the position he has espoused, but it provides us with a benchmark to 
examine when conducting an analysis of his views. Moreover, even if it is not the focus of 
the book as it is with One Door, Koontz often uses the moral status of various borderline 
entities as a major theme in his work. He highlights in his work questions as to whether 
various borderline entities matter in a way which is unique among those in the genres in 
which he works.
 8
 
 
Koontz, then, provides us with a compelling author to examine for our purposes. He is 
consistently listed as a well-known, best-selling author. He has a considerable number of 
borderline characters who provide a rich source of material to explore conceptions of moral 
status. Moreover, since these tend to be more scientifically-based borderline characters, they 
can perhaps provide some insight into potential entities which might one day exist. We might, 
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consequently, be less susceptible to complaints that we are focusing on entities which not 
only do not matter at the moment, but could never conceivably matter. In other words, we 
might, sometime in the future, live in a world where we can genetically modify dogs so they 
can communicate with us; we can never live in a world where vampires and werewolves 
exist. We also have the benefit that questions of moral status are ones that Koontz engages 
with in his work either as an explicit purpose, as it is in One Door, or as a general theme with 
which he works. This separates him from other writers of popular fiction, most of whom do 
not deal with these concerns on a regular basis. We are therefore required to do less 
extrapolation of his views on moral status then we might be required to do for other popular 
authors (many of whom do not address moral status claims at all). 
 
Presuming, then, that a reasonable argument has been made about the use of popular fiction 
in general and Koontz’s work in particular, this article will focus on his view on moral status. 
We will examine Koontz’s novels to get a better understanding of what appears to be how he 
determines which entities matter and which ones do not.   
 
Koontz’s works 
In order to do this, we will need to explore specific works within his overall oeuvre. Two are 
of specific interest to us:  Watchers (Koontz 1988), one of his most celebrated novels, and 
Koontz’s Frankenstein saga (Koontz 2009a; Koontz 2009b; Koontz 2009c; Koontz 2010; 
Koontz 2011).
9
 The general plots and important characters of these works are summarized 
below. 
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Watchers (1998) 
The plot of Watchers can be explained fairly simply. The two main characters are Travis 
Cornell and Nora Devon.  At the beginning of the novel, Travis meets a golden retriever who 
appears to be attempting to protect him. Travis takes the dog in and notices that the retriever 
seems to have a number of unusual abilities such as understanding human speech (as opposed 
to merely non-verbal cues), turning the handle on an outside water spigot, getting Travis a 
beer from the refrigerator without being asked and, most astonishingly to Travis, creating a 
“crude but recognizable” (page 62) question mark on the floor out of dog biscuits in an 
apparent attempt to ask Travis a question. Travis names the dog Einstein. 
 
Later, Einstein comes to Nora’s aid and subsequently protects her from a potential assault.  
Travis and Nora become romantically involved as a result of Einstein’s intervention, and 
Nora likewise learns of Einstein’s abilities. The two then teach Einstein to communicate first 
through the use of pictures and simple ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers. Einstein is later taught to read, 
and he learns to spell out more complex ideas through the use of Scrabble tiles. Through this 
method, Einstein explains that he is the result of a research experiment whose purpose was to 
modify a dog’s DNA to increase its cognitive abilities such that it is able to think and 
communicate. Einstein further explains that the government will be looking for him but so 
will something else referred to as the Outsider.  The Outsider is a wholly created creature – 
there is no existing animal which it resembles, but it is made of the genetic code of a number 
of different ones.  It is also intelligent, is largely genetically designed to be a killing machine 
and hates both human beings and (especially) Einstein. While the government agents chasing 
Einstein wish to return him to the lab, the Outsider instead wants to kill him. The final 
character of importance to our discussion is Vince Nasco, a freelance contract killer who is 
also seeking Einstein. There is the inevitable showdown between Travis, Nora and Einstein 
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against first, Vince Nasco, and then the Outsider. Travis kills both, but Einstein is severely 
injured. Einstein, however, recovers and he, Travis and Nora ended up living happily ever 
after.  
 
 Frankenstein (2009, 2010, 2011) 
Koontz’s Frankenstein saga is not, strictly speaking, a retelling of the Frankenstein myth. 
Instead, the books presume that the story in the original book by Mary Shelley (1818) was 
not fiction. In other words, there was a real Victor Frankenstein who created a ‘monster’ from 
bodies he unearthed from criminals and brought to life.
10
 That monster killed a number of 
people and then fled to the Artic with Victor chasing him. However, in the Koontz retelling, 
neither dies as they do in Shelley’s version. Both, instead, survive to the present day. In the 
intervening two hundred years, Victor Frankenstein’s hubris has turned to megalomania, and 
he seeks to eliminate the human race (minus himself) and replace them with cloned human 
beings he refers to as the ‘New Race’. At the start of the series, Victor has changed his name 
to Victor Helios
11
 and lives in New Orleans where he begins to populate the city with his 
‘New Race’ clones. The most important clone (for our purposes at least) is Erika. There have 
been five Erikas, all of whom have been Victor’s wife.12 She is unique among his creations 
because she alone is programmed with shame and humility. All of the clones, while 
purportedly humans, have had genetic enhancements. They are unnaturally strong and 
resistant to death either by violence, injury or illness. A number of them also have additional 
enhancements deemed useful or necessary for their positions.  
 
The monster, however, has spent the past two hundred years on the fringes of society and 
now calls itself Deucalion.
13
  It learns of Victor’s plans and teams up with two New Orleans 
police detectives, Carson O’Connor and Michael Maddison, who are investigating a series of 
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murders perpetrated by a serial killer known as the Surgeon who turns out to be, in part, one 
of the New Race.  The three pursue the killer and learn about Helios’ plans for the New Race. 
The New Race Surgeon dies but, in doing so, gives ‘birth’ to a small being which is 
compared to a troll.  At roughly the same time, Erika IV discovers a creature called Karloff – 
a monstrous entity which consists only of a head and an unconnected hand. At Karloff’s 
request, Erika IV disconnects Karloff killing him and is herself killed by Victor Helios as a 
result. The second and third books chronicle the chaotic devolution of the New Race. Many 
of Helios’ creations begin to exhibit what he terms an “interruption of function” (Koontz 
2009b, page 133) but which Deucalion, O’Connor and Maddison see as the clones spiraling 
out of control. The three attempt to prevent the potential crisis by stopping Helios’ plan. 
While this is happening, Erika V meets and befriends the troll (now named Jocko). A final 
confrontation ensues in a farm outside of New Orleans owned by Victor Helios. Helios is 
killed and, as a result all of his creations excluding Erika V, Jocko and Deucalion cease to 
exist.
14
  
 
The fourth and fifth books take place two years after the events of the original trilogy and 
move the location to Rainbow Falls, Montana. A cloned Victor, Victor Immaculate, has 
moved to a secret location outside Rainbow Falls. While Victor Helios sought to create a 
‘perfect’ society, Victor Immaculate’s ultimate plans are the destruction of every thinking 
creature on Earth. To facilitate that plan, he has also created clones although they are 
different to Helios’ clones. Unbeknownst to Victor Immaculate, Erika V and Jocko (now 
essentially a mother and her adopted son) have also moved to Rainbow Falls. Upon learning 
of Victor Immaculate’s existence, she contacts Detectives O’Connor and Maddison. 
Deucalion, sensing that Victor is still alive, also contacts them. Deucalion, O’Connor and 
Maddison travel to Rainbow Falls to deal with the threat presented by the new Victor. Aided 
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by Erica V, Jocko and some of the residents of Rainbow Falls, the three attempt to prevent a 
new disaster. Working together, they manage to stop the threat to Rainbow Falls and 
Deucalion kills Victor Immaculate. Once again, the death of Victor means the death of his 
created beings ending the threat. Those that survive then live out reasonably standard 
versions of a happy ending. 
 
With these summaries in mind, we can turn to the relevant features for the analysis of moral 
status in Koontz’s work. 
 
Multi-criterial theories of moral status 
We can begin any exploration of moral status in the work of Dean Koontz with his own 
views, stated most explicitly in the novel One Door (2001). In this novel, the antagonist is 
Preston Maddoc, a utilitarian bioethicist,
15
 who has killed a number of people including his 
disabled stepson. One of the protagonists is his disabled stepdaughter and one of the overt 
themes of the novel is the wrongness of utilitarian bioethics, particularly as it relates to the 
moral status of disabled persons. Koontz’s theme, then, is that all humans have moral status, 
regardless of disabilities.
16
 Indeed, Koontz has frequently used disabled characters in his 
novels, including the Frankenstein saga, Midnight, The Bad Place, Forever Odd, Hideaway, 
Dragon Tears, By the Light of the Moon, and Dark Rivers of the Heart. Disabled characters 
are thus relatively frequent in his writings and are usually either ‘good’ characters or 
associated with them. It is therefore unsurprising that Koontz appears to take the view that all 
human beings have moral status irrespective of disability. Looking more closely, though, a 
majority of the disabilities are physical rather than mental ones including the disabled 
characters in Midnight, Forever Odd, Hideaway, Dragon Tears, and Dark Rivers of the 
Heart. The stepdaughter in One Door also suffers only from a physical disability rather than a 
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cognitive or developmental one. Indeed, by her own admission, she is “precocious.” There is, 
while a minor character with cognitive disabilities in One Door, as a rule, though, characters 
with cognitive developments are fairly rare in Koontz’s literature as they only feature in The 
Bad Place, By the Light of the Moon and Frankenstein. Moreover, the characters who do 
have cognitive disabilities appear to be reasonably high-functioning ones. The 
institutionalized Down syndrome characters in The Bad Place and One Door appear to be 
relatively high-functioning.
17
 The characters with cognitive disabilities in Frankenstein and 
By the Light of the Moon do not need institutionalization at all. All of them are, thus, likely to 
satisfy either the test for capacity for rational thought or, at the very least, radical capacity for 
rational thought.  
 
Indeed, there have only been a couple of characters who have been so severely damaged as to 
(most likely) not satisfy the test for rationality. Those two individuals are the wife of one of 
the main protagonists in Strangers and the sister of one of the protagonists in One Door. It is 
again not necessarily clear from either book the extent of the damage, but there is information 
provided about their conditions. In both cases, the damage is a result of trauma. Both women 
were ‘normal’ women at one point but as a result of violence, both have lost capacity. While 
the wife in Strangers is in a coma-like state, the sister from One Door is harder to 
characterize. She is described as suffering from “serious brain damage that allows little self-
awareness and no hope of a normal life” (2001, page 144). However, she is apparently able to 
dress and feed herself although “she appeared…as if not entirely sure what she was doing or 
why she was doing it” (2001, page 145). She also apparently is capable of speech but rarely 
does so. It is thus not entirely clear what condition the sister has although it is clear that it is 
the result of brain trauma that she has limited self-awareness, extremely limited sociability 
and limited capability to provide for her own needs. However, despite the existence of these 
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two characters, there are no real ethical decisions made in relation to either. In the case of the 
wife from Strangers, her husband pays to keep her in a private care facility where she dies of 
natural causes. In the case of the sister in One Door, her brother also pays to keep her in a 
private care facility. He, however, makes few further medical decisions in relation to her care. 
She is murdered by a supposed utilitarian, but it is again not clear that the person in question 
really subscribes to utilitarian views.
18
 There is, then, no exploration of real hard cases in the 
treatment of either the wife in Strangers or the sister in One Door. Neither potential surrogate 
decision maker is asked or required to make a decision related to their medical care nor do 
they appear to give much, if any, thought to what the patient might want under the 
circumstances.  
 
We thus have an apparent preference for the view that all humans matter but without any 
difficult cases to truly test that hypothesis. There is, however, one way we might question 
Koontz’s apparent view that all humans have moral status. It is unclear to what extent he 
believes that those characters which are designated as ‘evil’ are entitled to moral status (or at 
least the moral status he believes the rest of us are due).
19
 The deaths of evil characters in his 
novels are not subject to any moral qualms or questioning by the protagonists. Moreover, it is 
clear that he does not expect us to feel anything negative about these deaths. We are not 
supposed to feel bad for them, as a general rule. The death of Prestor Maddoc, Vince Nasco 
or either Victor is seen as a good and righteous action on the part of those acting. We might 
attribute this to Koontz’s writing except for the fact that he clearly wants us to feel bad about 
other deaths. We should feel bad, for example, about the sister’s murder in One Door as well 
as the death of Maddoc’s stepson. Indeed, the most striking example of this happens in 
Watchers (1988). As noted above, there are two characters who die in the novel. The first is 
Vince Nasco. The second is the Outsider. Nasco’s death is short. Indeed, the entire gunfight 
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between Nasco and Travis, Nora and Einstein consists of two short scenes which cover four 
pages in the book. The actual death takes place in the context of a one-line response to Nasco 
from Travis and the only description is that Travis “opened fire” (page 462). After Nasco’s 
death, Travis, Nora and Einstein are more concerned with the gunfight ruining their plans to 
catch the Outsider than they are with anything related to Nasco himself. They refer to him 
only as a “wild card” and then discuss plans on how to dispose of the body while causing the 
least amount of disruption (page 462-463). In other words, the characters in question – the 
‘good’ protagonists in the novel – show no emotional response to the death of Vince Nasco or 
their actions which caused it. Vince Nasco is treated much more like a thing than he is a 
person. This can be contrasted with the views taken about the Outsider, who is, after all, 
supposed to be the main antagonist in the book. The Outsider is not human nor is he anything 
other than a genetically designed killer. By the end of the book, the Outsider has killed at 
least five people, and a number of animals in horribly brutal ways and attacked a thirteen-
year-old girl. Despite this, at least two of the characters, Travis Cornell and Lemuel Johnson, 
feel sympathy for it. Lemuel Johnson, the NSA agent searching for Einstein and the Outsider, 
explores a cave used by the Outsider. Due to a number of factors, Johnson makes the 
following pledge in his mind: “When I find you, I won’t consider trying to take you alive; no 
net or tranquilizer guns, as the scientists and military types would prefer; instead, I’ll shoot 
you quick and clean, take you down fast” (page 267-268). This pledge is referred to as not 
only being the “safest plan” but would also “be an act of compassion and mercy” (page 268). 
Travis, likewise, seems sympathetic to the Outsider at the end. After the Outsider attacks and 
severely injures Einstein, Travis tracks it to a barn. At this point, Travis believes that Einstein 
is dead. When he encounters the Outsider in the barn, it has a Mickey Mouse video in its 
hands.
20
 Unlike Vince Nasco’s death, the Outsider’s is longer and more complex. It is worth 
citing the passage in full: 
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 “Mickey,” The Outsider said, and as wretched and strange and barely 
intelligible as its voice was, it somehow conveyed a sense of terrible loss and 
loneliness. “Mickey.” 
 Then it dropped the cassette and clutched itself and rocked back and 
forth in agony. 
 Travis took another step forward. 
 The Outsider’s hideous face was so repulsive that there was almost 
something exquisite about it. In its unique ugliness, it was darkly, strangely 
seductive. 
 This time, when the thunder crashed, the barn lights flickered and 
nearly went out. 
Raising its head again, speaking in that same scratchy voice but with cold, 
insane glee, it said, “Kill dog, kill dog, kill dog,” and it made a sound which 
might have been laughter. 
 He almost shot it to pieces. But before he could pull the trigger, the 
Outsider’s laughter gave way to what seemed to be sobbing. Travis watched, 
mesmerized. 
 Fixing Travis with its lantern eyes, it said again, “Kill dog, kill dog, kill 
dog,” but this time it seemed racked with grief, as if it grasped the magnitude 
of the crime it had been genetically compelled to commit. 
 It looked at the cartoon of Mickey Mouse on the cassette holder. 
 Finally, pleadingly, it said, “Kill me.” 
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 Travis did not know if he was acting more out of rage or out of pity 
when he squeezed the trigger and emptied the Uzi’s magazine into the 
Outsider. (page 472) 
 
Like Lemuel Johnson, Travis’ response to killing the Outsider is mixed whereas his reaction 
to killing Vince Nasco is not. He is transfixed by the Outsider and, even in his own mind, is 
unsure whether the act to kill the Outsider is one of pity or anger. This death is emotionally 
complex for Travis in a way that Nasco’s is not. He somehow cares more about whether what 
he did was right in this context. This is a somewhat shocking development if all humans 
actually have moral status. Vince Nasco’s death, whether as a result of self-defense or not 
(and the killing of the Outsider is also at least partially one resulting from self-defense), is not 
treated as being morally complex or, indeed, as anything other than a minor inconvenience. It 
is therefore not entirely clear how much Koontz actually holds to the view that all humans 
have the same moral status.
21
 
  
Let us presume, however, that the view is the one Koontz appears to express in One Door: 
that all humans necessarily have moral status and a moral status equal to each other. Even if 
one accepts this as true, it does not mean that Koontz is really in the camp of those who argue 
that moral status is only species-related. As the many non-human or not-entirely human 
characters in his works show, he actually holds a more complex view. We can see this, at 
least in part, from One Door. Two characters important to the story are Curtis and Old Yeller 
who are an alien of some sort and a dog respectively. Curtis is a Messiah-type figure who 
both protects and is protected by the other characters in the book. He is clearly a character to 
whom we should ascribe moral status; likewise with Old Yeller, despite the fact that she is 
merely a dog (and not even a genius dog like Einstein). Curtis cares about and protects Old 
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Yeller referring to her as his “sister-becoming” (2001, page 172). Moreover, according to the 
novel, dogs appear to have at least part of the key to happiness and are worthy of protection 
as a result. So, even in the supposedly strident view taken in the novel, there is ambiguity as 
to whether only humans have moral status. 
 
More clear and complete information on his views come from Watchers (1988). As noted, 
Einstein is a particular dog, capable of communication, self-awareness, rational thought, and 
the ability to form preferences and plan accordingly. More importantly, other characters treat 
him as if he is different to other animals. For example, Einstein, because he is a lab animal, 
has been tagged. The method used for this is a tattoo. Einstein objects to this on the basis that, 
as he indicates, “Do not want to be branded. Am not a cow” (page 434). Nora’s reaction to 
this point is to realize that the tattoo “marked him as mere property, a condition which was an 
affront to his dignity and a violation of his rights as an intelligent creature” (page 434). She 
responds to Einstein “I do understand. You are a…person, and a person with… a soul” (page 
434). She further realizes that any God would approve of Einstein “not least of all because 
[of] Einstein’s ability to differentiate right from wrong, his ability to love, his courage and his 
selflessness” (page 434). As she indicates, “you [Einstein] were born with free will and the 
right to self-determination” (page 434). Nora, then, clearly sees Einstein as possessing moral 
status and, importantly, moral status on the same level as human beings. Travis makes similar 
statements claiming, “No one can be his master, but anyone should be damned proud to be 
his friend” (page 424). Other characters, including Lemuel Johnson, Nora’s family lawyer 
and a veterinarian who treats Einstein also make similar statements about his personhood, 
ability to care, and the fact that he ought not to be treated as property. This is despite the 
views they express about other animals including other dogs. The veterinarian, for example, 
originally believes Einstein to be a lab dog who was being used for cancer experiments. He 
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argues that animal experimentation can lead to important benefits and ought not to be stopped 
merely for the protection of one dog. It is only because he is shown Einstein’s abilities that he 
changes his mind. What we can take from these discussions amongst the characters is that 
Koontz believes (and wants us to believe) that Einstein matters deeply. He ought to matter to 
us as much as the other human characters in the novel like Travis or Nora. He is, as Nora 
indicates, a ‘person’, a statement which we are to believe is accurate whether Nora means the 
philosophical definition of person or not. 
 
But Einstein is not the only one who matters. We can return to the decisions made in relation 
to the Outsider by both Lemuel Johnson and Travis Cornell.  In deciding that the Outsider 
ought to be treated with compassion and pity, both are indicating that they feel it ought to be 
treated with some level of respect and worth. Indeed, one can see Travis’ decision to shoot 
and kill the Outsider as a fulfillment of its wishes as it asks to be killed. Moreover, the 
Outsider is presented as an entity which recognizes beauty, is self-aware,
22
 and tries to 
communicate with other beings.
23
 The Outsider might be owed different treatment to 
Einstein, but none of the characters appear to think he does not matter at all.  
 
This same theme is also present in the Frankenstein saga. Again, all of the clones are not 
really human, even to the extent of their DNA. They look like humans and have significant 
amounts of human DNA but are not human as such. This includes not only physiological 
differences between them and other humans but often the presence of non-human DNA. 
Moreover, we can consider a scale of different human-like cloned entities to see what extent 
the presence or absence of human-like attributes matters to Koontz’s beliefs about who is 
morally relevant in the story. At one end of the spectrum are (probably) Deucalion and Erika. 
Deucalion is the only of Victor’s creations to be at least mostly human. He is created from the 
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bodies of human beings and therefore contains only human DNA. He is given no specific 
designed enhancements by his creation (in the way that the members of the New Race are).
24
 
His appearance is monstrous, but he ends up being closer to human than many of the New 
Race. Furthermore, Deucalion has intelligence, compassion, the ability to create and develop 
plans and the other attributes of personhood. Indeed, his moral status is never questioned by 
anyone other than Victor Helios.
25
 Considering he views all humans (except himself) to be of 
no real moral status anyway, it does not appear to be a convincing statement of Koontz’s 
views. Victor’s views are ones which we ought to refute, meaning Koontz wants us to see 
Deucalion as a morally relevant creature.  
 
Erika is probably the most human of the New Race clones. While her physiology is different 
to human beings, she is the one most like human beings. She is also given a wider range of 
human emotions, including the capacity for shame, guilt, compassion and other ‘positive’ 
emotions instead of the purely negative ones which are all that the other members of the New 
Race can feel.  She is self-aware, capable of stating preferences and creating plans to satisfy 
those preferences, has empathy (particularly for Jocko) and other attributes of personhood. 
Her moral status, like Deucalion’s is not really questioned by anyone other than Victor 
Helios. Neither Deucalion nor Erika, though, are likely to cause much problems for our 
general conceptions of moral status. Both are likely human enough for even those who base 
moral judgments on species classification to consider them morally relevant. 
 
Other characters are less easy to accept, however, at least on those terms. The first is Jocko 
who by his own admission, began life as a tumor. He is described as being physically 
monstrous. He is described as being “a funny-looking dwarfish guy with a knobby chin, a 
lipless slit for a mouth, warty skin and huge, expressive, beautiful – and  eerie – eyes.” 
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(2009c, page 71)
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 Another character notes that, if Jocko is a boy (as he is described by Erika 
V), then “[his] dictionaries were so out of date that he might as well burn them” (2011, page 
267).  Nor is Jocko’s physiology similar to ours even in general ways. He eats soap because 
he thinks it tastes good. He is further described as squirting a “strange but fortunately 
odorless green fluid” from his right ear and talking in unknown languages for an hour after 
being given the Heimlich maneuver (2010, page 126). When a cinnamon roll gets stuck in his 
throat, he uses two plastic corks in his ears and a can of compressed air normally used to 
clean computer keyboards to get it out. Koontz, then, is keen to highlight the ways in which 
Jocko is distinctly not human. Despite this, in the latter two novels at least, Jocko is given 
heroic status. He finds out crucial information regarding Victor Immaculate’s plot to destroy 
humanity and has a key role in occupying the children in Rainbow Falls. Moreover, other 
characters, once they get over his unusual physical features, treat him with dignity and 
respect. As noted above, this, in particular, is the case with Erika V who considers Jocko to 
be her adopted son. Others such as Deucalion, however, also treat him with respect, the 
children enjoy his company, and he becomes a television star at the end of the book. The role 
of the children in the story might be an especially important point considering the source 
material. In the original Mary Shelly novel, the monster kills Victor Frankenstein’s younger 
brother, William, because even that young child cannot overcome his feelings for the 
monster’s hideous features (Shelley 1991). Children, in particular, despite the more extreme 
ugliness of Jocko, consider him to be enjoyable company. Jocko also clearly matters and 
while his frequent mishaps are meant to add a comic element to the story, we are also 
supposed to care what happens to him and to want to see him succeed. 
 
Karloff is another character which stretches the boundaries of human-ness. An experiment of 
Victor Helios’ who appears in the first novel, Karloff is, if anything, more an extreme 
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physically abnormal specimen than even Jocko. Karloff does not possess a body but merely a 
head and a disconnected hand. The head itself has only “half formed” features, and his face is 
considered a “travesty” (2009a, page 347). Indeed, so strange and disturbing is the creation 
Karloff that Erika IV, herself a New Race clone, considers him an object of pity. Koontz 
himself refers to Karloff’s “life” in quotation marks indicating that whatever ‘having a life’ 
means, Karloff does not possess it (2009a, page 358). Again, though, despite the extreme 
nature of his existence, Erika IV is shown to have pity for it. She communicates with it, 
listens to its plea for death and helps Karloff to die. Erika IV’s decision is one we are 
supposed to empathize with not just because Koontz wants us to feel compassion towards her 
struggle to be more than Victor Helios made her but also because of Karloff’s pain and 
suffering. Killing him, then, is the compassionate choice but having compassion for him 
requires that he have some moral status in the first place. 
 
Thus, even if we accept Koontz’s apparent general view that all human beings matter, he 
does not hold the view that only human beings matter. Entities who are rational, show 
preferences, and are capable of valuing their own existence (even if they do not under the 
circumstances) also are morally relevant under his view. More interestingly, there is evidence 
that dogs, at least, are morally relevant even if they are not philosophical persons. That dogs 
might be morally relevant irrespective of cognitive abilities is perhaps not surprising from a 
writer who has written at least three books ascribed, at least partially, to his dog.
27
 We might 
wonder, however, on what basis Koontz ascribes them moral status. This leads us to consider 
two additional elements which appear to be part of Koontz’s theory on moral status. The first 
is the value of community or social factors. While it does not appear to be the deciding factor 
in whether something is morally relevant or not under Koontz’s view, it does play an 
important modifying effect. Those entities which at least strive to be part of a community are 
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considered to be more morally relevant than those that are not. We can see this both with 
Watchers as well as Frankenstein. In Watchers, Einstein is considered to be morally relevant 
long before the Outsider, at least on the views of Lemuel Johnson and Travis Cornell. This is 
despite the fact that on the two criteria previously determined to be relevant to Koontz, 
Einstein and the Outsider are equal. Neither is human, and both are philosophical persons. 
We therefore cannot distinguish between the two on those grounds. The best explanation then 
may be to look at when people begin to consider the Outsider to be morally relevant instead 
of merely as a monster that needs to be killed. In the case of Lemuel Johnson, the Outsider 
becomes morally relevant after Johnson views the cave where the Outsider lived. It was 
viewing the Outsider’s attempts to bridge a gap between itself and other creatures that 
Johnson views it as something other than just a creature. Travis Cornell has a similar 
experience. It is the attempt to communicate, both through words and the possession of the 
Mickey Mouse tape, which creates the feelings of pity and compassion in Travis for the 
Outsider. Both, then, are struck by the attempts by the Outsider to be part of a community. 
While that attempt is necessarily futile, the striving for community is what is relevant.
28
 
 
The same is true for characters in Frankenstein. What separates Erika from the other New 
Race clones is not her physiology. While there are some differences, none of them is 
substantial enough to ground differential treatment between our views of her and the other 
clones. Instead, the focus is on her developing relationships with others – Karloff in the case 
of Erika IV and Jocko in the case of Erika V.  This can be contrasted with the rest of the New 
Race who do not have communities or engage in social relationships. Their very genetic 
coding prevents socialization either in couples, family groups, or wider communities. Indeed, 
the paucity of relationships appears to be one of the factors which leads to the chaos and 
destruction of the New Race in City of Night and Dead and Alive. This emphasis on 
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community and relationships appears to be the foundational concept for which Koontz 
includes dogs in his list of those with moral status. Dogs in his literature form an important 
part of our social communities and are often companion figures for major characters (e.g., 
Einstein in Watchers or Old Yeller in One Door). They are thus important because of their 
role within our mixed social communities.
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The final aspect worthy of consideration is Koontz’s views on genetic hardwiring, a frequent 
issue in his novels. Many characters, and especially his monstrous ones, often have genetic 
limitations on either what they can do or what they can avoid doing. The Outsider, for 
example, seemed genetically unable to stop killing. Even were the Outsider to wish to avoid 
killing other things, he could not do so. The same is true of the New Race who have, by and 
large, a genetically hardwired hatred of the Old Race. They kill ordinary humans not only 
because they enjoy it but also because their genes make it impossible for them to do 
otherwise. While this raises interesting questions about moral responsibility, it also provides a 
way of distinguishing between those things with moral status and those without. For Koontz, 
it is the striving against our genetic makeup which plays at least some role in our moral 
status.
30
 For characters like Erika, it is not that they are genetically hardwired which comes 
into play but that she is able to overcome this obstacle because of her inherent sociability and 
sense of community. Indeed, another New Race clone, like Erika, develops a maternal streak. 
In Erika, that maternal streak provides a basis for her growth and eventual joining of a larger 
community. In the case of the clone, there is no larger societal engagement. She takes offense 
to her partner arguing that wanting a baby makes her soft insisting that she still likes killing 
people as much as anyone. The clone then, despite her wish to be a mother, never exceeds her 
genetic programming. Instead, Koontz uses this particular wish of the clone as further 
evidence of the breakdown of the New Race programming. Erika, however, uses her feelings 
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of compassion and empathy for Jocko to become something different (and in Koontz’s eyes 
better) than Victor Helios wanted her to be. Even for a character such as the Outsider, for 
whom the possibility of exceeding his genetic programming is ultimately futile, that struggle 
provides a way to personalize it in a way that members of the New Race never are. How we 
struggle and strive against our limitations (and our genetic limitations are only the most 
stringent of those) allows us to grow. And - Koontz appears to believe - that growth may 
make entities which were not as morally relevant become more morally relevant as a result of 
that striving. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, based on his books, Dean Koontz appears to be using a multi-criterial method 
for determining which entities matter. It is a mixture of purely species-based criteria (all 
humans matter), characteristics of the entity in question (all rational persons matter), and 
social and cultural factors (those entities in a community or that strive against their 
limitations are more morally relevant than they otherwise might be). The first two categories 
appear to be categorical ones, by and large, while the social and cultural factors he relies up 
appear to modify those categories in cases where they lead to unwelcome outcomes. Of 
course, this is probably not a complete theory of moral status. Koontz avoids some difficult 
questions about particular entities (those in PVS, for example), and there are certain areas (for 
example, whether the environment has any moral status as an entity) in which he appears not 
to have expressed any interest whatsoever. Even the relatively basic view expressed in the 
books, though, must be a multi-criterial one. More importantly, the view expressed by 
Koontz is not incoherent. Despite the fact that there are three or four principles in play, it is 
not difficult to determine who matters under the Koontzian view and why they matter.  
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Indeed, we can test this hypothesis by exploring one of the possibilities Koontz leaves open. 
For example, we can come to a reasonable conclusion on how the sister in One Door ought to 
be treated. As a reminder, the sister in One Door is cognitively disabled as a result of trauma. 
While it is unclear what her exact diagnosis is, she has limited self-awareness and social 
interaction. She is capable of performing certain basic tasks and is conscious but her 
prospects for recovery are slight. For our example, let us presume that she does not get 
murdered but instead lapses into a comatose state. She still has minimal consciousness – she 
isn’t brain dead – but she has been placed on a ventilator to regulate her breathing and is 
receiving artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH). After a period of time, the doctors come to 
the conclusion that her chances of recovery are very slim and ask her brother about removing 
the ventilator and ANH. How would we expect someone taking a Koontzian view to react to 
such a request? Based on what we know, Koontz would presumably determine that the sister 
does have at least some degree of moral status, even in her comatose state. She is human even 
if she does not satisfy the mental characteristics necessary for personhood. We might further 
add that she is considered part of a social community at least by her brother and possibly by 
other individuals within her care home. Thus, we would expect someone to treat the sister as 
if she matters. That means, in determining whether to remove the ventilator and ANH, we 
must consider what is best for her, not what is best under an abstract value such as ‘overall 
happiness’. She cannot simply be treated as a means to an end. That does not mean, though, 
that ANH and the ventilator cannot be withdrawn from her. If we determine that withdrawing 
ANH and the ventilator is best for the sister even though it leads to her death, there is nothing 
within the Koontzian stated position on moral status which means we could not do that. For 
example, if we determine the sister’s situation to be similar to the one Karloff suffered in the 
Frankenstein saga, then removing her life-sustaining measures might be appropriate. If we do 
not consider the sister’s life to be as bad, we may be less inclined to believe we can remove 
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the ventilator or ANH. It is not surprising, though, that knowing the position on moral status 
gets us only part of the picture because moral status claims are only ever part of the equation. 
There are often a number of other principles in play during a scenario such as the removal of 
ANH and artificial ventilation. Since Koontz provides us with very little to go on in relation 
to those other principles, we are limited in the number of direct answers we can get. What is 
important, however, is that, knowing Koontz’ position means we can figure out what the 
relevant questions are that need to be answered and what is necessary for those answers to be 
given.    
 
What we can learn from this is illustrative of the uses of popular culture in bioethics 
generally. Ordinary people do have views on moral status, and those views are often more 
complex than uni-criterial theories tend to be. They involve a number of different ways in 
which entities might come to possess moral status and principles may interact and perform 
different functions. Using characters from popular culture allows us to explore the 
complexities of these viewpoints and to explore a range of scenarios in which these views 
provide incomplete or difficult answers. They help us to provide substance to these debates 
for those who do not normally engage in them as well as highlight why these sorts of 
questions are important. Moreover, through understanding how popular culture explains 
moral status claims to ordinary members of the community provides a window into how (at 
least some) people view these kinds of moral claims. Koontz’ view, despite its numerous 
principles, appears to be one people understand. It is one that can be explained and used by 
others and, presumably, makes sense to those who read his novels – something shown by his 
success as an author. It thus not only provides further support for the position that at least 
some portion of the community uses a multi-critieral view which is at least similar to the one 
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Kootz uses but also that these theories are a plausible approach to exploring the moral status 
of entities in general.  
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 Entity is an admittedly thin, context-dependent word. However, theories of moral status need to consider a broad 
range of possible beings affected by the decision in question. This can include human beings, non-human animals, 
plants, microbes, and even the environment. In order to encompass all of these possibilities, the term entity will be 
employed to stand in for all of these possibilities. 
2 There are also other moral status systems which are similar, but use different terminology. For example, Deryck 
Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword have presented a view of moral status based upon moral agency (2002). 
3 So far, there are very few multi-criterial theories of moral status. All, however, have posited different levels of 
moral status ranging from having no moral status to full moral status with at least one intermediate level. 
4 Dean Koontz (1945 – present) is an American author of popular fiction. His books tend to be considered horror 
novels although he appears to prefer to refer to them as cross-genre including aspects of horror, suspense, action, 
romance, science fiction and other genres. He has written (as of 2012) at least 103 books (including graphic novels 
and ebooks) and in 2012 was considered the 10th best-paid author in the world according to Forbes magazine 
(Bercovici 2012). 
5 http://www.deankoontz.com/about-dean/ (accessed December 6, 2012). 
6 Ibid.  
7 Koontz has argued that his fiction isn’t really ‘horror’ fiction at all. He contends it is cross-genre fiction and 
includes a number of elements (Gorman 1994). That particular classification concern is not an especially relevant 
issue for our purposes and will, henceforth, be ignored. 
8  The exception to this might be JK Rowling, at least within her Harry Potter series. The political and moral rights of 
non-human characters was a frequent theme in that series. 
9  The Frankenstein saga consists of the following five individual books: Prodigal Son, City of Night, Dead and Alive, Lost 
Souls and The Dead Town. The first two books were originally published with co-authors but both have been dropped 
from subsequent versions. 
10 The original Shelley story merely lists ‘unhallowed graves’ (Shelley 1991) which includes criminals but could also 
include other people – suicides, for example. While those who committed suicide were criminals in Shelley’s time, 
they are not necessarily the violent criminals (murderers, rapists, arsonists, etc.) commonly associated with the 
Frankenstein myth. Koontz follows the standard trope, however, and indicates that the human parts which make up 
the monster are from criminals, particularly violent ones. 
11 Over the course of the series, there are two different Victor Frankensteins. The first is the one from Shelley’s 
novel brought forward to modern times. The second is a clone. For ease of identification, the first will be referred to 
as Victor Helios and the second as Victor Immaculate, the name he gives himself. Victor Helios is the main 
antagonist in the first three books. Victor Immaculate is the antagonist in the final two. 
12 Only the last two, designated Erika IV and Erika V, appear in the novels.  
13 This is a nod to the original story by Mary Shelley. The subtitle of the original book is The Modern Prometheus. 
Deucalion, in Greek mythology, was the son of Prometheus. 
14  All of Victor Helios’ creations are implanted with a device which kills them if Victor dies. Deucalion, however, 
never received the device and Erika V and Jocko are protected by a bolt of lightning. 
15 More correctly, Preston Maddoc is what Koontz seems to believe a utilitarian bioethicist is. Maddoc makes a 
number of claims, not least the central ones in relation to the individuals with disabilities, which is at odds with any 
number of versions of utilitarian ethics, including the ones presented by Peter Singer and John Harris.  
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16 While Koontz does not perhaps explicitly state the view that all humans have moral status, it seems a reasonable 
assumption to make based upon the novel. Not only is the protection of disabled persons an important aspect, one 
of the main protagonists expresses both the view that all human beings are worthy of respect as well as the belief 
that utilitarianism is not only terrifying but completely wrong. These views on utilitarian bioethics are repeated in the 
Author’s note at the end of the novel which provides at least some indication that the views expressed by the 
character are Koontz’s own views.  
17 The character in One Door Away from Heaven with Down syndrome is described as being “severe” and he is not a 
major enough character to be able to truly grasp the limits of his disability (Koontz 2001). However, it is clear that 
the character can have preferences, is able to value his own existence, and is able to empathize with others. 
18 As with Prestor Maddoc, the utilitarian position taken by the individual in question is a caricature of a real 
utilitarian position.  The sister is apparently killed because it “will bring more happiness” into the world. At the very 
least, the utilitarian calculation used to reach that decision fails to account for her brother or anyone else who might 
be positively affected by the sister’s continued existence. For example, the nursing home where she resides loses 
financially due to her death, the court system needs to go through the expense and complication of a needless 
murder trial, etc. Not killing the sister is, in fact, probably the better decision for a utilitarian.   
19 A particularly stark example of this might be Deucalion’s views about Victor Helios in the Frankenstein saga. When 
talking about him, Deucalion indicates the following : “Victor is no god… He is not even as little as a false god, nor 
half as much as a man. With his perverse science and his reckless will, he has made of himself less than he was born, 
has diminished himself as not even the lowliest beast in nature could abase and degrade himself.” (Koontz 2009b, 
page 255). 
20 Mickey Mouse videos are an important humanizing element for the Outsider. In the cave, Lemuel Johnson finds a 
Mickey Mouse bank and that is part of what causes his views on how to deal with the Outsider. According to the 
story, both Einstein and the Outsider used to watch Mickey Mouse videos in the lab, a pastime both enjoyed.  
21 It may be the case, of course, that Koontz’s argument would not be that Vince Nasco has lost all moral status as a 
result of his psychopathy. Instead, it might be argued that Koontz’s point is that the moral action required of Travis 
at that point was to kill him in self-defense. He is, after all, protecting himself, his wife Nora, Einstein (who is less of 
a pet and more a friend), and his and Nora’s unborn child. Even so, it is striking the differences between the ways 
the deaths of the two killers are portrayed.  
22 In particular, the Outsider seems to recognize its status outside of creation and seems painfully aware that it is 
different from other things, that it should not exist and that its creation was a mistake (Koontz 1988). It would not 
be a misunderstanding to compare the way the Outsider views its existence to the way the ‘monster’ views its 
existence in the original Frankenstein novel by Mary Shelley (1991). 
23 The Outsider was not designed to be capable of speech. However, as the passage quoted above indicates, it 
teaches itself to talk. Again, this is not very different from Frankenstein’s monster in the original story. 
24 There are a number of differences between Deucalion and normal human beings. However, all of the 
“enhancements’ are supposedly the result of the lightning which animated him instead of Victor Frankenstein’s 
deliberate plan. Deucalion gives the lightning religious significance. 
25 While his moral status is not, Carson O’Connor at least questions whether he is human. She indicates the 
following: “As for being human, there was the fright figure in Allwine’s apartment [Deucalion], who claimed not to 
be human, unless he believed that being cobbled together from pieces of criminals and being brought to life by 
lightning was not a sufficient deviation from the usual dad-makes-mom-pregnant routine to deny him human status” 
(Koontz 2009a, page 234).  
26 Erika V’s description of Jocko is not necessarily echoed by everyone. When Carson, Michael and Deucalion meet 
Jocko, he is described as “a trollish thing in children’s clothes, Rumpelstiltskin cubed, a cacodemon, a hobgoblin, a 
thing for which no word existed, a thing wearing a floppy hat decorated with tiny bells. Its eerie yellow eyes were 
bright with some terrible hunger, and its hideous face twisted into a mask of hatred so raw that Carson and Michael 
– and even Deucalion – skidded their chairs back from the table and shot to their feet in alarm” (Koontz 2010, page 
217).  It is, however, clear from the passage that Jocko is actually smiling.  
27 The three books in which his dog Trixie was named as at least a co-author are: Bliss to You: Trixie’s Guide to a Happy 
Life; Life is Good!: Lessons in Joyful Living  and Christmas is Good! Trixie Treats and Holiday Wisdom. 
28 Indeed, Koontz considers this one of the primary themes in Watchers. Creating families and a sense of community 
is particularly important for Koontz and is highlighted in the novel. 
29 It might also explain, at least in part, Koontz’s views about his evil characters. Vince Nasco lives outside of society 
and abhors human conduct, Victor Helios considers himself above other human beings and Prestor Maddoc 
removes himself from society. 
30  Koontz makes the following comparison between The Outsider and Vince Nasco: “The Outsider at least longs 
to be like the dog, Einstein, though his engineered genetic nature makes it impossible for him to change: Vince 
Nasco, born of man and woman, is as savage as The Outsider but doesn’t want to change and is, therefore, the 
more despicable of the two – and in some ways the more frightening.” (Gorman 1994).  
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